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1. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, Hindu Law and the Constitution,
Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1994, pp. xix+188, Rs. 150.
2

, Muslim Law and the Constitution,
House, Calcutta, 1994, pp. xi+225, Rs. 190.

2nd Edn.,

2nd Edn., Eastern Law
Siddharth Raja*
P. Ramaswamy*

In India, where case compilations pass off as treatises, the two books of
Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee provide a breath of fresh air. These two books
are mainly based on two series of Lectures delivered by the honourable judge
at the Calcutta University. The book on Hindu Law and the Constitution was
a product of the Manmatha Nath Bose memorial Lecture of 1981; the other
book, a result of the Ibrahim Saliman Salahjee Lectures. Both books are in
their second edition, with their author having revised them in response to
legal developments since. Further, the author has added a new chapter each
to both books; in the book on Hindu Law, Chapter 1 has been inserted dealing'
with the timeless relevance of Hindu jurisprudence, and, in Muslim Law and
the Constitution, Cbapter 6, examining issues of maintenance and guardianship in light of significant legislative and decisional alterations in the state
of lawl.
Both books have been reviewed conjointly, as they represent the
entire exposition of the interaction of the two main religious laws of India
with its secular Constitution. Read together, they provide a complete constitutional picture.
The books, even if one disagrees on ideological grounds, are an erudite
enquiry. They are examples of rational, lucid, legal thought rarely attempted
by anyone. It is recommended that students read these books not merely for
their contents, but also for the sheer breadth of vision they incorporate. For
all the legal complexities investigated, the books adopt a direct and simple
style which makes reading a pleasure.
Tow broad themes from the essence of both books, namely, the supremacy of the Part III Fundamental Rights, and the universality of equality.
The author concludes that personal laws in India, both Hindu and
Muslim, are laws in force' within the event that these laws are violative of
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any of the Part III rights, they would be void as per Art. 13 (1)2. Any precept
or principle administered by the courts are laws in force' as per Art. 372 (1),
whether statutory or non-statutory, customary or common3. Obviously, in the
opinion of the Honourable Judge, personal laws having been administered for
centuries, regulation the civil affairs of the people, would be squarely covered by Arts. 13 (1) and 372 (1).
To illustrate the author's pint, the Muslim law allowing polygamy is
violative of Art. 15, as it allows Muslim men to take multiple partners while
prohibiting the same to Muslin females4. Under Sec. 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the mother is a Class 1 heir, inheriting equally in the case of
a male Hindu, whereas, she stands excluded by the children and the husband
of the deceased daughter, in the case of a female dying intestate. In Justice
Bhattacharjee's opinion, this is clearly prejudicial to the interests of the mother.
Notwithstanding
specific violations, any law that isolates for its application only a particular religious community is per se violative of Art. 15.
This renders the entire gamut of codified Hindu and Muslim law void. In
Justice Bhattacharjee's opinion, judicial pronouncements which hold that the
personal laws discriminate not only on the basis of
religion but on other
factors, such as respective historical, social and cultural circumstances, are
irrelevant5.
This is because what is crucial in determining invalidity of
legislation is not their object but the direct operation or legislation is not their
object but 'the direct operation or effect' of the law6. it is therefore not
surprising that the author puts the question 'if different personal laws apply to
different religious communities only on the ground of profession of the
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particular
religion and the provisions of these laws are discriminatory,
then
would not the conclusion be irresistible that the direct operation or effect of
these different laws is discrimination
on the ground of religion only?'
This brings into focus the current debate on the uniform Civil Code.
Looking at the situation from a purely legal viewpoint, Art. 44 would not just
remain a directive, but become an imperative.?
Justice Bhattacharjee,
clearly disgusted with our continued reliance
on concepts of law essentially western in origin,
advocates a renaissance
of
ancient Indian legal thought.
After all, even in John D. Mayane's opinion, .
Hindu law has the oldest pedigree of any known
system of jurisprudence'.
The impact of the Constitutional
scheme with its equality clauses and avowed
egalitarian
philosophy,
on this oldest law of ours, has been little understood
and vaguely expounded.
The sage of our courts' relationship to the personal laws in our Constitutional
regime, recounts a sad tale. The judges have failed to appreciate,
with a few honourable
exceptions,
the full impact of the basic values of the
fundamental
law. As Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, points out in his preface in
Muslin Law and the Constitution,
we, the bench and the bar, tradition bound in
pusillanimous
punditry,
missed the vision of a dynamic, progressive
legal
order and crept on by and large sticking to the past. Maybe Justice Bhattacharjee's
contribution
would be further thought'. That would in the ultimate analyse
prove the fittest tribute to·tow fine works of legal writing.
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